In order to deeply analyze the safety behavior of coal miners,the prospect theory and evolutionarygame theory are combined to construct a coal miner-security inspector game model,analyze the stability of thestrategy choice of the game party,and use MATLAB to conduct numerical simulation experiments to analyze theeffects of labor and mental cost perception,reward perception and penalty perception on the evolution of coalminers' safety system.The main contribution of this paper is to incorporate the perceived value of participantsinto the game model based on prospect theory,so that the strategic choice of the game subject is closer to reality.The results show that labor and mental cost perception are negatively correlated with the safety behavior ofcoal miners and security inspectors,and reward perception and punishment perception are positively correlatedwith the safety behavior of coal miners and security inspectors.The research results provide suggestions for the16safety management of coal enterprises from the aspects of reducing safety production costs and improving thereward and punishment mechanism.
文章内容来自网络，如有侵权，联系删除、联系电话：023-85238885
参与评论
请回复有价值的信息，无意义的评论将很快被删除，账号将被禁止发言。
评论区